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Articles 
TELEPATHIC LAW 
Larry Alexander* 
The debate between originalists (of the authorially-
intended-meaning variety) and their opponents usually has two 
strands. One strand has to do with what interpreting a text is. 
Originalists like me—a group that includes Paul Campos,1 
Stanley Fish,2 Steven Knapp,3 Walter Benn Michaels,4 and Sai 
Prakash5—argue that when one is interpreting a text, as opposed 
to doing other things with it, one is necessarily seeking its 
author’s or authors’ intended meaning. After all, a text is just a 
code, a set of symbols—sounds, marks, flags, puffs of smoke, 
pictures, etc.—selected by an author to convey an idea to a 
specific audience. No set of symbols self-declares the code that it 
is. It may look like twenty-first century American English as 
prescribed by Merriam-Webster and Strunk & White. But it may 
be a different code. It may be Esperanto, or it may be a code in 
French keyed to a certain American novel. It may be nineteenth 
century South African English, or Australian English. It may be 
a Martian language that perhaps uses the spaces between the 
marks as its letters. Or it may not be a code at all, but marks 
made by wind and rain, a leaky pen, or monkeys on typewriters. 
All of these are logical possibilities. For originalists like me, 
however, one can only successfully interpret a text by 
determining what code it is, which itself is determined by 
 
 *  Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of 
Law. Thanks to Steve Smith and Mitch Berman for their comments. 
 1. Paul Campos, Three Mistakes About Interpretation, 92 MICH. L. REV. 388 
(1993). 
 2. Stanley Fish, There is No Textualist Position, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 629 (2005). 
 3. Steven Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, Not A Matter of Interpretation, 42 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 651 (2005). 
 4. Id.; see also Walter Benn Michaels, A Defense of Old Originalism, 31 W. NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 21 (2009). 
 5. Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is That English You’re Speaking?” 
Why Intention Free Interpretation is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967 (2004). 
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authorial intent. An author or authors can be more or less skilled 
at making clear to his or their intended audience what code is 
being used. For if the audience doesn’t know what code is being 
used, the uptake intended by the author will fail to occur. 
The originalist (of my stripe) derives from this point a 
corollary: If you derive any meaning from a text other than the 
authorially-intended one, you are not interpreting that text. 
Rather, you are imagining it to be a different text. You are 
imagining it either to have been written by authors other than its 
actual authors, or to have been written in a different context 
(with different concerns and goals) from its actual context, or to 
have been employing a code other than the code actually 
employed. You can “interpret” The Waste Land by imagining its 
author to have been e. e. cummings or Eminem and not T. S. 
Eliot. You can imagine “Meet me at the bank” to have been 
uttered by a fly fisherman rather than a banker. And you can 
imagine the Equal Protection Clause to have been written by 
Ronald Dworkin, John Rawls, William O. Douglas, or Anthony 
Kennedy rather than by the post-Civil War Congress. All that is 
possible, but it is not interpretation. It is re-authoring, 
appropriating someone else’s symbols for one’s own purposes, 
like the kidnapper who cuts out the letters for his ransom note 
from a magazine. 
At this point the opponents of originalism usually respond 
with a loud “Sez who?” Who are we originalists to legislate the 
meaning of “meaning” or “interpretation”? You can call what 
we nonoriginalists do with texts non-interpretation or re-
authoring, but we call it interpretation, and you have no 
authority to dictate that we are misusing the term. 
At this point the debate between originalists and their 
opponents stalemates. The strand concerning what interpreting a 
text really is has run its course, and the nonoriginalists have 
remained unmoved. They have demurred to the originalists’ 
claim that to interpret a text just is to ascertain its authorially-
intended meaning, and that other approaches amount to re-
authorings rather than interpretations. 
Originalists regarding legal texts may then switch to a 
different strand of the debate. They may argue that the reason 
we should seek the actual authors’ intended meaning is that the 
actual authors possessed the legal authority to promulgate 
norms, and their texts just are their communications of the 
norms they intended to promulgate. If we ignore their intended 
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meanings in favor of any of the infinite possible meanings 
someone else might have intended through this set of symbols, 
then we are ignoring the legal norms promulgated by those with 
legal authority in favor of norms promulgated by persons who 
lack that authority. If, for example, Congress has the legal 
authority to make federal statutory law, then to ignore the 
congressionally-intended meaning of a federal statute in favor of 
a meaning that was not congressionally intended is to construct a 
federal law that lacks constitutional authorization. So, too, if the 
ratifiers of the Constitution and its amendments are the persons 
with authority to make and change constitutional norms, then to 
“interpret” the Constitution as if it had been authored by 
someone other than its ratifiers is to make constitutional “law” 
without authority to do so. 
What do nonoriginalists say in response to this argument, an 
argument advanced by Rick Kay,6 Steve Smith,7 and me?8 They 
typically do not deny that Congress is the body authorized to 
make federal statutes, or that the ratifiers are persons with 
authority to make and amend the Constitution. Rather, they 
concede this, but then go on to argue that the authority to make 
statutory or constitutional law is the authority to make the 
texts—the set of symbols—but not the authority to determine 
what those symbols mean. 
Now, to repeat a point made earlier, it is true that the text—
the symbols—of statutes and the Constitution could have been 
used to convey all sorts of meanings other than those 
authorially-intended. And it may well be true that frequently the 
symbols lawmaking authorities choose are better suited to 
convey meanings different from what they intend. All of that is 
true, but for originalists it is beside the point, which is that the 
authors of those symbols were the ones possessed of authority to 
make and change the law, making the meanings they intended 
for their symbols to convey “the law.” Nonoriginalists, however, 
must deny that such authority extends beyond the authority to 
 
 6. Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 703 (2009); see also Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the 
Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 
NW. U. L. REV. 226 (1988). 
 7. See Steven D. Smith, The Maker-Meaning Nexus (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with author). 
 8. See Larry Alexander, What Are Constitutions, and What Should (and Can) They 
Do?, 28 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2011). 
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promulgate the symbols. For them, the symbols are “the law,” 
not what they were meant to symbolize. 
To see the oddity of this nonoriginalist view, however, 
engage in the following thought experiment. Lawmakers, we 
assume, try to communicate their intended meanings as clearly 
as they can. However, because of linguistic imprecision, 
variations of usage, and the passage of time, they inevitably fall 
short. 
Suppose, however, our lawmakers could convey the norms 
they intend for us to follow telepathically. They would not need 
to promulgate any text. They would agree on those norms 
among themselves—telepathically perhaps—and then convey 
the agreed upon norms to the rest of us telepathically. Of course, 
each of us might carry a “text” of such norms in our minds. But 
the “text” in one person’s mind could differ from the “text” in 
another’s mind. What is key is that however the norms were 
represented in people’s minds, everyone would understand 
precisely what those norms require in each conceivable 
circumstance of application. 
What objection could one have to law promulgation 
through (perfect) telepathy? For the originalist, this scenario is 
one of perfection. No more messy fallible texts to be 
misunderstood. Such texts were imperfect media for transmitting 
the lawmakers’ determinations to the populace. Telepathy is a 
great improvement, for it results in no one misunderstanding 
what the law requires. 
How would nonoriginalists react to law promulgation 
through telepathy? If they would welcome it, then it seems that 
they have no quarrel with originalists. So if they have a quarrel, 
they must object to telepathic law. But why? 
One possible objection would be that lawmakers can never 
anticipate all possible applications of their norms. Their 
intended meaning will be uncertain, even to them, in some range 
of applications. Therefore, even if telepathic communication 
were possible, perfect understanding of what the communicated 
norms required in all situations would not be possible. 
That is a point originalists should concede. Lawmakers’ 
intended meanings will be equivocal, even to the lawmakers 
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themselves, in some range of possible cases.9 And perfect 
communication of those intended meanings will do nothing to 
solve that problem. The other side of that coin, however, is that 
in the remaining cases the authorially-intended meaning can 
determine outcomes. So telepathic communication would be 
useful for those cases. Therefore, unless one wishes to deny the 
existence of general intended meanings—that when I say “green 
things,” I intend to refer to a vast multitude of items that are 
green in various hues and not just the particular green elm I have 
in mind when I make the statement10—the fact of some range of 
indeterminacy or uncertainty does not defeat the utility of 
telepathically communicating lawmakers’ intended meanings. 
The other possible objection would be based on the 
fallibility of the lawmakers. Even if we are sure how they 
intended their norms to apply, we may know reasons that they 
did not know—because of their historical or cultural setting, 
their factual ignorance, or their prejudices—why their intended 
applications are undesirable. 
I shall consider below the possibility of giving interpreters 
the legal authority to deviate from the intended meaning of the 
lawmakers. Here, however, I wish to comment more generally 
on arguments from fallibility. 
It is, of course, true that lawmakers are fallible creatures of 
their time and place, their understanding of the world, and so on. 
Any norms they promulgate will therefore be fallible. And some 
will quite possibly have very undesirable consequences when 
faithfully applied. Yet to make such an argument against 
following lawmakers’ intended norms is to make an argument 
against law. For law is a human artifact. Even a legal system that 
lacked legislation and that purported to follow the “natural law” 
or the “moral law,” in order to count as a legal system, would 
require authorities to determine what the natural law or moral 
law required. Those authorities would be fallible, but their 
determinations would be authoritative (else they would not be 
authorities). And the meanings of their determinations would be 
what they intended them to mean—meanings they might wish to 
communicate, if they could, through telepathy rather than 
through imperfect texts. 
 
 9. See LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES 115–16 
(2001). 
 10. See id. at 112–14. 
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If nonoriginalists would have no cogent objection to 
telepathic law, then their nonoriginalism perhaps stems from the 
fact that lawmakers communicate their norms through texts 
rather than through telepathy. Yet it is hard to see why the 
search for authorially-intended meanings should be abandoned 
just because of the possibility of error in ascertaining those 
meanings. The authorially-intended meaning of a legal text can 
be misunderstood, but so what? 
Finally, nonoriginalists may object to giving absolute 
lawmaking authority to the lawmakers who authored the text in 
question. Originalism, however, is not an answer to who has 
lawmaking authority. Its position is that whoever has lawmaking 
authority, it is their intended meaning that governs. If their 
intended meaning does not govern, then they necessarily lack 
lawmaking authority. Originalists can happily concede that the 
authority of one set of lawmakers—say, the Constitution’s 
ratifiers—might be limited by the authority of another set—say, 
the Supreme Court justices who placed a misinterpretation of 
the ratifiers’ intended meaning in a now well-entrenched 
precedent, or who determined that the ratifiers’ intended 
meaning was “too unjust.” Originalists qua originalists have no 
position on the allocation of legal authority in any particular 
legal system. But notice that even in a system such as that 
hypothesized, the intended meaning of one set of authorities 
(the ratifiers) is trumped by the intended meaning of another set 
of authorities (the Supreme Court). The different authorially-
intended meanings can be lexically ordered in terms of their 
relative authority. But in no sense can they be intelligibly 
combined—blended, averaged, or the like—into a meaning that 
is no one’s intended meaning. (Such combinations are 
incoherent; they are like “combining” pi, green, and the Civil 
War.11 And even if it was possible, which it is not, it would render 
the resulting law a “mindless” product.)12 Authorially-intended 
meanings are still the basis of the law, and telepathic 
communication thereof would still be desirable. 
Finally, one might argue as follows: Authorities have the 
ability to make law only if they truly are authorities. The ratifiers 
of the Constitution were the makers of our fundamental law only 
 
 11. See LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, DEMYSTIFYING LEGAL 
REASONING 213–14 (2008). 
 12. See Steven D. Smith, Law Without Mind, 88 MICH. L. REV. 104, 109, 117 (1989). 
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if they had authority to do so. And they had that authority only 
if we, today, at this moment, accept that they did. If we no longer 
accept their authority to make fundamental law, then they lack 
that authority, even if our predecessors accepted their authority. 
But why then, we might ask, should we accept their authority? 
And should we not predicate our acceptance of their authority 
on the normative desirability of the Constitution they made 
rather than to attribute authority to them sight unseen? 
Telepathic communication of their norms is of consequence only 
if they have authority to govern us by those norms. 
The points are correct. But notice that they do nothing to 
undermine originalism, which is agnostic regarding who the 
authorities—the lawmakers—are. For the originalist says that 
whomever we accept as authorities to make law, constitutional 
or otherwise, it is their intended meanings that count. 
If we do not like the product of the 1789 constitutional 
ratifiers, we might urge acceptance of our own, much better 
document. If we succeed, then our document—a code conveying 
our intended meanings—will be the supreme law of the land. Or, 
to recur to the first strand of originalism, we might retain the 
parchment version in the National Archives but urge others to 
accept that it be read as if it had been written by John Rawls, 
Ronald Dworkin, Larry Tribe, or Oprah. It will then mean what 
those folks would have intended it to mean. Although it is 
decidedly odd to have one person or group of persons author the 
symbols of a legal communication, and then look to another 
person or group and ask what they would have meant had they 
authored those symbols, it is surely possible to do so. 
Note, however, that if a constitution’s normative virtues 
must be traded off against the virtues of wide acceptance and 
stability, then we might find the optimum attainable constitution 
is the one that assumes ultimate legal authority resides in the 
1789 ratifiers. And if so, then their original meaning would be 
our fundamental law, and telepathy from them would be a boon. 
And the nonoriginalist’s response is. . .? 
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APPENDIX: THE CONTRIBUTION THESIS 
The claim is often made that the authorially-intended 
meaning of an authoritative legal text, like a constitution or a 
statute, contributes to its legal meaning but is not identical to it. 
Let us put aside authoritative but erroneous interpretations 
(mistaken precedents). Those create conflicts of authority that 
are orthogonal to this issue. Likewise, let us put aside standards 
of judicial review and burdens of proof, which bear on legal 
meaning in adjudication but not on legal meaning per se. If those 
matters are put aside, is not the authorially-intended meaning 
identical to the legal meaning? 
There are two related views that deny this. One, associated 
with Philip Bobbitt,13 holds that arguments from authorially-
intended meaning—original meaning—are only one of several 
modalities of legal argument. There are, on an equal footing with 
arguments from the original meaning, arguments from text, 
precedent, justice, and prudence. 
The modalities argument is a nest of confusions. First, the 
fact that lawyers argue for their favored outcome by invoking 
whichever of these factors seems to favor their position does not 
mean the law is nothing but the argumentative practice of 
invoking these disparate considerations. Presumably, when 
lawyers invoke text, justice, or original meaning, they claim that 
the factor they invoke, not their practice of invoking it, is the law. 
Second, the law cannot be all of these modalities 
simultaneously. Indeed, the law can only be one of them, for the 
modalities Bobbitt (and others) identify cannot coherently be 
combined. Some of them could be lexically ordered, so that 
precedent could trump original meaning, or vice versa. Or 
extreme injustice might trump both. (Injustice per se could not, 
as law exists to settle authoritatively what justice requires.) But 
there is no sensible way one can nonlexically “combine” 
precedent, original meaning, and justice, for example. That 
would be like combining pi, green, and the Civil War.14 
If there were these several modalities, and if as I have 
argued, they are uncombinable, then when two opposed 
 
 13. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982); see also PHILIP BOBBITT, 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 3–42 (1991). 
 14. I invoked this trope in the text at note 11 supra. 
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lawyers invoke different modalities as constituting “the law,” 
either they are arguing past each other, or else they are urging 
the court to choose, perhaps for this case only, their favored 
modality. I say “for this case only” because the various 
modalities are supposed to persist despite not being 
determinative in particular cases. 
In truth, each modality represents a different legal system. 
In constitutional law, each modality represents a different 
Constitution. In the original meaning modality, the Constitution 
is the set of norms intended by the framers and ratifiers of 1787, 
1868, and so on. In the modality of precedent, the Constitution is 
the set of norms that Supreme Court decisions have established, 
presumably because the Court viewed those norms at the time 
they were announced as consistent with the Constitution’s 
original meaning. In the justice modality, the Constitution 
consists of those norms that the “interpreter” believes justice 
requires. It is the Constitution as if it had been written by—pick 
your favorite—Ronald Dworkin, John Rawls, Robert Nozick, 
John Stuart Mill, and so on. Because these modalities cannot be 
coherently combined, and because it is incredible to believe that 
advocates are invoking a modality—a Constitution—and asking 
the court to choose it for this case only, the modalities 
conception collapses. 
My suspicion is that the appearance of several modalities is 
produced for the following reasons. First, the original meaning 
and erroneous judicial accounts of that original meaning that are 
embodied in precedents create two conflicting sources of legal 
authority. Second, considerations of justice cannot, as I have 
said, be combined with original meaning or precedent. Nor can 
justice compete with original meaning given that the purpose of 
having authoritative legal texts and tribunals is to settle 
authoritatively what justice requires. At most, considerations of 
justice can be invoked when an authoritative standard needs to 
be given content, or invoked as evidence of original meaning. All 
of the other modalities mentioned by Bobbitt and others, can, I 
believe, be shown to be derivative of original meaning or 
precedent. 
The other view that denies that the original meaning of legal 
texts is identical to their legal meaning is somewhat more 
elusive. Mitch Berman holds that even if the original meaning of 
a legal text is X, and even if no one holds that “the law” arises 
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from something other than that legal text, we might have strong 
legal intuitions that the law is not X. 
Berman gives as an example whether John McCain, who 
was born in the then American territory of the Panama Canal 
Zone, was a “natural born citizen” as the Constitution requires 
for eligibility for the presidency.15 He argues that we might have 
strong intuitions that McCain was eligible as a matter of 
constitutional law, and that those intuitions might persist even if 
we were to discover that the original meaning of the 
constitutional clause made McCain ineligible. 
In another paper, Berman fleshes this idea out a good deal 
more.16 He asks us to imagine that the Equal Protection Clause’s 
original meaning dealt only with the state’s provision of legal 
protection, not with when the laws themselves were relevantly 
unequal. He asks us then to imagine that soon after the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, people, including lawyers, 
judges, and legislators, started assuming that the original 
meaning of the Clause went well beyond protection and 
extended to unjust discrimination in the content of the laws. 
There was never an authoritative Supreme Court holding to this 
effect. There were lots of dicta in Court opinions supporting this 
broader notion of equal protection, however, and legislators 
routinely invoked the broader notion to argue against the 
passage of various laws. 
Berman then asks us to imagine that after a long period in 
which almost the entire legal community held this expansive 
view of the Equal Protection Clause—again without any 
Supreme Court decision directly on point—a judge were to 
discover conclusive evidence of the original, narrow meaning of 
the clause. According to Berman, it would be in bounds to argue 
that the narrow meaning was not “the law,” and that the more 
expansive meaning was. 
Now I think Berman is just plain wrong here. Remember 
that originally, people assumed (mistakenly) that the broad 
meaning was the originally intended one. Their original error 
merely ramified over time. To see why Berman’s view is 
mistaken, compare his example with this one. Suppose the state 
 
 15. Mitchell N. Berman, Reflective Equilibrium and Constitutional Method: Lessons 
from John McCain and the Natural Born Citizen Clause, in ORIGINALISM IN 
PERSPECTIVE (G. Huscroft & B. Miller eds., forthcoming). 
 16. Unpublished paper on file with author. 
!!!ALEXANDER-TELEPATHIC LAW_JOHNEDIT.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 12/17/2010  3:42 PM 
2010] TELEPATHIC LAW 149 
 
legislature enacts a statute of limitation of three years for some 
business tort. Suppose further that lawyers and judges thereafter 
fail actually to look up the statute of limitations in the statute 
books. They instead begin assuming that it is two years, perhaps 
because two years is standard for other torts and because other 
states make it two years for the particular tort in question. There 
is never an actual holding by a court that this state’s statute of 
limitation is two years, but one can find plenty of dicta to that 
effect. And lawyers routinely refuse to bring tort suits because 
they all believe the suits are barred by a two-year limitation. 
Now suppose that one day a tort lawyer is thumbing 
through the statute books and discovers that the statute of 
limitations for the business tort is three years, not two. Or at 
least that is what the statute says. This lawyer has a client who 
suffered this tort more than two but less than three years ago. So 
he brings suit. The defendant demurs, invoking the well known 
“two year statute of limitations.” The judge is about to rule for 
the defendant, when the plaintiff’s lawyer produces the statute. 
Assume that defendants cannot claim any prejudice if the statute 
of limitations turns out to be three years rather than two. Would 
the judge be correct to say that despite the statute, the real 
statute of limitations is two years? I believe that not even 
Berman would support this. However, I can see no relevant 
difference between this example and his. 
My hunch is that the legal intuitions argument gets 
whatever force it has in cases where the original meaning is 
unclear and where we think considerations of policy or justice 
strongly favor one possible meaning over the other. That 
explains whatever force Berman’s examples have. On the other 
hand, where the mistakenly assumed original meaning is viewed 
as neutral or as undesirable, the “legal intuition” view has no 
purchase. Most people, for example, probably wish that the 
Fourteenth Amendment had not granted birthright U.S. 
citizenship to the children of aliens temporarily or illegally in the 
country. No other country does this, and there are no good 
reasons to do it. Still, almost everyone assumes and has assumed 
for a long time that the Fourteenth Amendment dictates this 
result. If we now become convinced by scholars like Peter 
Schuck and Rogers Smith17 that this interpretation is 
 
 17. See PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT 
CONSENT: ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY (1985). 
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erroneous—that “subject to the jurisdiction”18 was intended to 
mean “subject to the exclusive jurisdiction”—would we still want 
to say that the new interpretation was not the law? I think not. 
 
 
 18. See U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, cl. 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the 
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States 
. . . .”). 
